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Abstract 
 
Despite the extensive debate on the effects of bank competition on economic welfare and 
growth, only a handful of single-country studies deal with the impact of bank competition 
on the cost of credit. We contribute to the literature by investigating the impact of bank 
competition on the cost of credit in a cross-country setting. Using a panel of firms from 
20 European countries covering the period 2001–2011, we consider a broad set of 
measures of bank competition, including two structural measures (Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index and CR5), and two non-structural indicators (Lerner index and H-statistic). We find 
that bank competition increases the cost of credit and observe that the positive influence 
of bank competition is stronger for smaller companies. Our findings accord with the 
information hypothesis, whereby a lack of competition incentivizes banks to invest in soft 
information and conversely increased competition raises the cost of credit. This positive 
impact of bank competition is however influenced by the institutional and economic 
framework, as well as by the crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The debate on the effects of bank competition on economic welfare and growth is far 
from settled. While the virtues of competition are obvious for many industries, increased 
competition in the banking industry has dubious benefits due to the peculiar features of 
the industry and the crucial role of information. Bank competition can be detrimental to 
financial stability, while information asymmetries influence the relationship between 
bank competition and access to credit (Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine, 2006; Berger, 
Klapper, and Turk-Ariss, 2009; Schaeck, Cihak and Wolfe, 2009; Beck, De Jonghe, and 
Schepens, 2013; Ryan, O’Toole, and McCann, 2014).2 
The theoretical literature provides conflicting predictions concerning the impact of 
competition on access to credit. The market power hypothesis suggests that greater bank 
competition relaxes financing constraints and leads to lower lending rates. This 
hypothesis is in line with the general economic theory that suggests that greater 
competition is associated with lower prices. The information hypothesis rejects this view, 
arguing that increased bank competition bolsters financing obstacles and drives up 
lending rates. The information hypothesis assumes that lower competition increases the 
incentive for banks to invest in relationship lending
3
, so that they can have greater soft 
information reducing information asymmetries. Thus, a higher level of bank competition 
lowers investment in banking relationships and impairs access to credit (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1995; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006).4 
A large body of empirical literature considers the influence of bank competition on 
access to credit. While these studies range widely in geographic scope and employ a 
variety of indicators for access to credit and competition measures, they usually come 
down on the side of the market power hypothesis, i.e. that greater bank competition is 
                                                 
2
 Literature on bank competition also investigates the effects of bank competition on market structure of 
non-financial firms (Cetorelli, 2004) and identifies the determinants of bank competition (Claessens and 
Laeven, 2004). 
3
 For more details concerning the literature on relationship lending see Kysucky and Norden (2016). 
4
 While Petersen and Rajan (1995) conclude that greater competition reduces lending rents for banks and 
hence contributes to diminish their investment in lending relationships, Boot and Thakor (2000) extend this 
analysis by considering that this result is observed if banks are only engaged in relationship lending. They 
find that the effect of competition on relationship lending is dependent on the activities of the bank in both 
relationship and transaction lending but also on the potential competition faced by the bank from capital 
markets. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 3 
associated with better access to credit. In a cross-country study, for example, Beck, 
Demirgüc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2004) investigate the impact of bank concentration on 
access to finance measured by survey data on the financing obstacles perceived by firms. 
They find a positive impact of bank concentration on financing obstacles. Love and Peria 
(2012) also perform a similar cross-country investigation using an alternative measure for 
bank competition, the Lerner index. Although competition alleviates financing obstacles 
they find the effect depends on the economic and financial environment. Carbo-Valverde, 
Rodriguez-Fernandez, and Udell (2009) analyze the relation between bank competition 
and credit availability, measured at the firm level by the dependence on trade credit, on a 
sample of Spanish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). They, too, find that 
greater bank competition is associated with lower credit constraints. Ryan, O’Toole, and 
McCann (2014) examine the impact of bank competition measured by the Lerner index 
on credit constraints for a sample of firms from 20 European countries. They identify 
financial constraints through sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal 
financing. Their findings indicate that bank competition diminishes credit constraints.
5
 
While bank competition is found to facilitate access to credit in line with the market 
power hypothesis, the literature says little about the channels through which market 
power provides this beneficial effect. Bank competition seems to contribute to better 
access to credit by relaxing lending conditions such as collateral requirements (Hainz, 
Weill, and Godlewski, 2013) and reducing the cost of credit. It is then reasonable to ask 
whether greater bank competition actually reduces the cost of credit in line with this 
intuition and whether the market power hypothesis really drives a counterintuitive 
relation between competition and price on lending markets.  
Notably, most studies give short shrift to the impact of bank competition on the cost 
of credit. The handful of works that take on this topic stem from the seminal investigation 
of Petersen and Rajan (1995) on the impact of bank concentration on loan rates. They 
                                                 
5
 A few studies have also investigated the impact of competition on relationship lending, which is 
connected to our research question since competition can affect access to credit through greater or lower 
investment in relationship banking. Elsas (2005) and Degryse and Ongena (2007) provide evidence of a u-
shaped relation between bank concentration and the investment of banks in relationship lending. Presbitero 
and Zazzaro (2011) extend these works by suggesting that the non-monotonicity of this link comes from 
the influence of the organizational structure of local credit markets through the presence or the absence of 
large and functionally distant banks. 
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find lower loan rates in concentrated banking markets, evidence that supports the 
information hypothesis. In contrast, several single-country studies (Sapienza, 2002, for 
Italy; Kim, Kristiansen, and Vale, 2005, for Norway; and Degryse and Ongena, 2005, for 
Belgium) provide evidence that supports the market power hypothesis, i.e. they find a 
positive influence of bank concentration on loan rates. 
Our aim in this study is to examine the impact of bank competition on the cost of 
credit. We advance the understanding of bank competition by providing the first cross-
country analysis investigating the impact of bank competition on the cost of credit using 
micro-level data. In a cross-country sample, we utilize the variation in bank competition 
that guarantees satisfactory degrees of freedom for the estimations. We use a panel of 
firms from 20 European countries for which we have firm-level data on the cost of credit. 
The banking sector plays dominant role as a source of financing for firms in the majority 
of these countries. Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2004) show that the institutional 
and economic framework influences the impact of bank concentration on access to credit. 
Here, we investigate the possible influences of the institutional and economic 
environment of a country on competition and cost of credit. Our large cross-country 
sample provides a suitable setting for determining whether country characteristics 
influence this relationship. 
To this end, we consider a broad set of indicators to measure bank competition. The 
measurement of competition is subject of a major debate in the empirical literature on 
banking. Structural measures such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and concentration 
indices are widely adopted (e.g. ECB, 2014), even if they only infer degree of 
competition from indirect proxies such as market share rather than provide exact 
measures of competition. In contrast, non-structural measures such as the Lerner index 
and the H-statistic infer bank conduct directly and have become increasingly popular in 
empirical works on banking. For example, Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007), 
Turk-Ariss (2010) and Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez, and Udell (2009) all show 
that the link between bank competition and financing constraints can be influenced by the 
choice of competition measure. An analysis of the effects of bank competition must 
therefore consider several competition metrics to check if results are consistent across 
these measures. We use four competition measures in our work: two non-structural 
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indicators (Lerner index and the H-statistic) and two structural measures (Herfindahl-
Hirschman index and CR5). Our analysis provides a comprehensive view of the influence 
of bank competition on the cost of credit. 
We face several challenges in our investigation. First, the measurement of the cost 
of credit at the firm level is difficult due to data constraints. Data on individual loans are 
available notably through credit registries but they are single-country datasets (e.g., 
Degryse and Ongena, 2005) or they are available exclusively for large loans (e.g. Qian 
and Strahan, 2007). Our question, however, is of particular interest for small companies, 
given the potential role of bank incentives to invest in soft information and the limited 
access of these companies to other sources of finance. Thus, we use accounting data to 
measure the cost of credit and calculate the ratio of interest expenses to total bank debt. 
This indicator measures the implicit interest rate charged by banks. Carbo-Valverde, 
Rodriguez-Fernandez, and Udell (2009) also use this indicator to measure the loan 
interest rate for each firm. 
Second, we must rely on aggregate measures of competition because we require 
information on a battery of competition measures for a large set of European countries 
and therefore it is impossible to measure bank competition at the local level for each firm. 
Such information is only available at the aggregate level, which explains the common use 
of aggregate measures of bank competition in cross-country studies on the impact of bank 
competition (e.g. Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine, 2004; Love and Peria, 2012; Hainz, 
Weill, and Godlewski, 2013; and Ryan, O’Toole, and McCann, 2014). As a consequence, 
a limitation of our work is the fact that we do not have bank-firm specific information. 
This study is divided into five sections. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 
describes the measures of competition and the econometric specifications. Section 4 
displays the results. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. Data 
 
We use firm-level data from Amadeus, the database maintained by Bureau van Dijk, 
which contains comprehensive financial information on public and private companies 
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across Europe. Focusing on EU 20 countries for the period from 2001 to 2011,
6
 our 
sample contains over 13 million firm-year observations for more than 4.5 million firms. 
The annual panel is constructed by combining multiple updates of the Amadeus database. 
Every update contains a snapshot of currently active population of firms and the up to ten 
most recent years of firms’ financial data. If a firm stops providing financial statements, it 
is removed from the database after four years. Using multiple snapshots of the database 
lets us add back observations for firms not present in more recent updates. It eliminates 
the survivorship bias and extends firms’ historical financial data beyond the most recent 
ten years. 
Most firms in Amadeus report unconsolidated financial statements, but 
consolidated statements are provided if available. In our dataset, we use unconsolidated 
financial statements to avoid double counting firms and subsidiaries or operations abroad 
and exclude firms that report only consolidated statements. We also exclude the financial 
intermediation sector and insurance industries (NACE codes 64–66), which have a 
different balance sheet and specific liability structure.  
The key firm-level variable is Cost of credit defined as the difference between the 
ratio of financial expenses divided by bank debt
7
 and the country’s nominal short-term 
interest rate. This measure of the implicit interest rate, which is in line with Carbo-
Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez, and Udell (2009),
8
 captures the cost of credit well. The 
majority of our sample consists of micro and small enterprises that lack access to non-
bank funding sources, so the majority of their financial expenses are loan expenses. 
Two firm-level control variables are taken from the literature. The first is Size 
defined as the log of total assets as firms of different size have different financing 
patterns (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008). The second is Tangibility, 
measured as the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets. A higher proportion of 
tangible assets that could serve as collateral may indicate better opportunities for 
obtaining external financing.  
                                                 
6
 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain. 
7
 Bank debt in the Amadeus database is decomposed between short-term bank debt (“loans”) and long-term 
bank debt (“long-term debt”). We define bank debt as the sum of both components. 
8
 Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez, and Udell (2009) define the loan interest spread as the difference 
between the ratio of loan expenses to bank loans outstanding and the interbank interest rate. 
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To assess whether the impact of competition differs depending on firm size, we 
distinguish among micro firms (i.e. firms with fewer than ten employees or a turnover or 
total assets less than 2 million euros), small and medium-sized firms (either less than 250 
employees or a turnover less than 50 million euros or balance sheet total less than 43 
million euros) and large firms.
9
 Micro firms (36 %), and small and medium-sized firms 
(58 %) together constitute about 94 % of our entire sample. 
Country-specific variables come from different datasets. Two competition measures 
(Lerner index, CR5) come from the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD). As 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is missing in this database, we draw on the ECB’s SDW 
database for our information. As the H-statistic has many missing values in the GFDD, 
we use the H-statistic estimated with Bankscope data from Weill (2013). 
One additional country-level variable comes from the GFDD: Private credit 
defined as the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions to GDP. GDP per capita and Inflation are both extracted from the World 
Development Indicators. Rule of law comes from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
Following other studies, we require that all key variables have non-missing values. 
All explanatory variables are truncated at 1 %, top and bottom. The resulting sample 
constitutes an unbalanced panel. 
Descriptive statistics of all variables are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 reports 
descriptive statistics concerning our competition measures by country. The definitions of 
variables are provided in the Appendix. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Competition measures 
The literature on industrial organization provides a number of indicators, based on 
different methodological approaches, for measuring bank competition. They can be 
classified into two categories. The first relies on the traditional Structure-Conduct-
                                                 
9
 For a detailed classification of firms by size in Europe, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/sme-definition/index_en.htm  
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Performance (SCP) model, whereby structural indicators are used to measure 
competition. The SCP paradigm states that higher concentration in the banking market is 
negatively associated with competitive conduct and leads to higher profitability as banks 
are able to set higher loan rates or lower deposit rates. Indicators used to measure 
competition include the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) and n-bank concentration 
ratios such as CR5, the market share of the five largest banks. 
Unlike the SCP, the second category of competition measures, which are based on 
the new empirical industrial organization, develops non-structural measures of 
competition that take into account bank conduct. While the SCP approach posits that 
competition can be inferred from indirect proxies like market structure or market share, 
non-structural measures measure directly banks’ conduct in response to changes in 
demand and supply conditions without taking market structure into account. These 
measures include the Lerner index and the H-statistic based on the Rosse-Panzar model. 
All rely on the analysis of the effective behavior of firms in the market. 
Both structural and non-structural measures of competition are used in empirical 
banking studies. However, given the limitations of structural measures, non-structural 
measures have recently become increasingly important.  
To provide a broad perspective of the impact of bank competition on the cost of 
credit, we follow the existing research and consider four measures of bank competition. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index and CR5 are structural measures. The Herfindahl-
Hirschman index is the sum of the squares of market shares for all firms in the industry. 
During the observation period, its value ranges between 0.0158 in 2001 to 0.4039 in 
2005. CR5 is the five-bank concentration ratio defined as the percentage of the market 
controlled by the top five banks in the market in total assets. By this measure, the banking 
systems of European countries are fairly concentrated (maximum value 100 for Estonia, 
minimum value 47.85 for Italy). 
We further employ two non-structural measures. The Lerner index is defined as the 
difference between price and marginal cost, divided by price. It indicates the effective 
behavior of banks by measuring the ability of a bank to set its price above marginal cost 
and thus the individual bank’s market power. A higher Lerner index value suggests lower 
bank competition. Its mean values by country are generally within the range from 0.09 
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for Germany to 0.27 for Bulgaria (Finland, with a value of -0.12, is the exception). The 
H-statistic is estimated using the Rosse-Panzar model (Rosse and Panzar, 1977). It is the 
sum of the elasticities of total revenues to input prices. The H-statistic value provides 
information on the nature of competition in a market. A value below or equal to 0 
indicates monopoly, between 0 and 1 monopolistic competition, and 1 perfect 
competition. Following the lead of e.g. Claessens and Laeven (2004), we consider the H-
statistic as a continuous measure of competition. It ranges between -0.1575 and 0.8324 in 
our sample. 
 
3.2 Econometric specifications 
Our main interest is the relationship between competition in the banking sector and the 
cost of credit for a firm. Panel dimension of our data enables us to control for firm-level 
heterogeneity. We start with the estimation of the following base specification: 
                                                                                
where      is the cost of bank credit for firm i in country j at time t; X is a set of 
firm-specific determinants (Size, Tangibility); Z is a set of country-level variables 
(Private credit, Rule of law, GDP per capita, Inflation); Competition stands for one of the 
four competition measures;  is a firm fixed effect,  is a time fixed effect, and ε is a 
random error term. 
All models are estimated with firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
country*industry level. Even if clustering by country might be preferable in some cases 
(Pepper, 2002), the true standard errors could be consistently estimated when the number 
of clusters approaches infinity. When the number of clusters is low (less than 50) and 
cluster sizes unbalanced,
10
 inference using a cluster-robust estimator may be incorrect 
(Nichols and Shaffer, 2007; Cameron and Miller, 2015). Thus, clustering by country is 
inappropriate and we employ clustering at the country*industry level. 
There are several arguments based on which possible endogeneity problem can be 
reduced in our empirical analysis. First, bank competition is computed at the country 
level, while measures for cost of credit are firm-level characteristics coming from a 
                                                 
10
 The low number of clusters may range from less than 20 to less than 50 clusters in the balanced case and 
even more clusters in the unbalanced case (Cameron and Miller, 2015).  
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different data source. It is therefore unlikely that cost of credit measures can influence 
bank competition. Second, the panel structure of our dataset allows us to include firm-
level fixed effects and thus remove all time-invariant unobservable effects that could 
potentially affect both bank competition and cost of credit. Third, we perform the main 
estimations by lagging the observations by one year for all independent variables to 
reduce the contemporaneous reverse causality. Our main results do not change.
11
 In 
addition, we perform a robustness check by employing instrumental variables 
estimations.  
 
 
4. Results 
 
This section presents the results of the estimations. We first comment on the main 
estimations and then provide the results by firm size and by opacity level. We continue 
with results including various interactions and complete the analysis with results for 
different sub-periods and several robustness tests. 
 
4.1 Main estimations 
We perform regressions explaining what determines the cost of credit. Four regressions 
are estimated, each employing a different competition measure. Results are reported in 
Table 3. With the exception of the H-statistic, higher values of competition measures are 
associated with lower level of competition.  
We observe that the coefficients are significant and negative for the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index and CR5. These findings support the view that bank concentration is 
negatively associated with the cost of credit. We observe a similar pattern, i.e. a 
significant and negative coefficient, for the Lerner index. The coefficient for the H-
statistic is positive but not significant. The results for the four competition measures thus 
indicate that bank competition increases the cost of credit. This finding accords with the 
information hypothesis, whereby competition does not undermine the cost of credit. 
                                                 
11
 These estimations are available upon request. 
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Notably, both structural and non-structural measures lead to the same conclusion, 
indicating that the difference in results does not reflect the difference between structural 
and non-structural measures of competition. 
To see the economic significance of the main results reported in Table 3, consider 
the case in which Lerner index changes by one standard deviation (i.e., 0.1). Then the 
cost of credit changes by 0.01144*0.1 = 0.001144, representing a 1.66% change from the 
mean value of the cost of credit. Similarly, the results in column (3) of Table 3 imply that 
for the same change in CR5 (one standard deviation), the cost of credit changes by 
0.004114 or 5.96% from the mean. Furthermore, according to the results in column (4) 
the change in Herfindahl-Hirschman index leads to a change of 0.007029 in the cost of 
credit, which is 10.2% change from the mean.
12
  Therefore, the effect of the competition 
on the cost of credit is economically meaningful. 
In analyzing other explanatory variables, we note that firm size and tangibility of 
assets are significantly negative, in line with the intuition that larger firms and firms with 
higher tangibility of assets are more likely to have lower cost of credit. As expected, 
better law enforcement favors lower cost of credit, while higher inflation has a positive 
association with cost of credit. Interestingly, greater financial and economic development 
tend to enhance the cost of credit. This might be explained by the fact that access to credit 
is easier in more financially and economically developed countries, so young, riskier 
firms are also able to obtain credit. As these firms need to pay higher interest to 
compensate for their higher risk, the average cost of credit rises. 
 
4.2 Estimations by size and by opacity 
Our main estimations indicate that bank competition influences the cost of credit in line 
with the information hypothesis, which says that banks invest more in soft information 
when competition is lower. Such investment helps banks mitigate information problems 
in lending. As a result, the information hypothesis should apply predominantly to SMEs, 
which typically are more opaque than larger firms (Berger and Udell, 1995). There is a 
large strand of literature showing that information asymmetries play a more significant 
                                                 
12
 We do not discuss the economic significance of the results for H-statistics as the estimated coefficient is 
not significant. 
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role for SMEs, leading to the fact that investment of banks in relationship lending is of 
prime importance for their access to credit. 
Following this hypothesis, we further investigate whether the relation between bank 
competition and the cost of credit differs with the size of firms. We expect to observe 
greater positive influence of bank competition on the cost of credit for smaller 
companies. We re-estimate our regressions by considering separately groups of firms by 
size: micro companies, SMEs, and large companies. The estimation results are presented 
in Tables 4 and 5. 
Our findings strongly support the information hypothesis. The coefficient estimates 
for both the Lerner index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index are negative and 
significant, indicating a higher cost of credit in more competitive environments for micro 
companies and SMEs. The coefficient is not significant for large companies. In the case 
of the H-statistic, the estimated coefficient is positive and significant for micro 
companies, but not significant for SMEs and large companies. These results support the 
information hypothesis even if the estimated coefficient for H-statistic was not significant 
in the main estimations. Here the H-statistic indicates that greater competition is 
associated with greater cost of credit for smaller companies. This is in line with the 
hypothesis that bank competition contributes to a higher cost of credit for these more 
opaque borrowers. We see, however, no difference for different sizes of firms in the 
findings for CR5: the coefficient is significantly negative for all three size classes of 
firms. 
In line with the view that information hypothesis applies in particular to more 
opaque companies, we additionally examine whether the relation between bank 
competition and cost of credit differs with the opacity of firms. Opacity is hard to define 
and measure and therefore size is commonly used as a proxy for opacity. However 
Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004) propose to use the ratio of total assets to 
fixed assets at the industry level as an indicator of private information. We utilize this 
indicator to classify all companies of our sample in three groups of equal size based on 
their level of opacity: high opacity, medium opacity, low opacity. We run our main 
regressions by considering each group of companies. The results are reported in Tables 6 
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and 7. 
The results are in line with the information hypothesis. The coefficient of 
competition variable is significant and negative for high opacity and medium opacity 
groups but not significant for low opacity group with the Lerner index and HHI. The 
positive impact of competition on cost of credit is only observed for the most opaque 
companies, which accords with the information hypothesis. With CR5 measure, we have 
a significantly negative coefficient for all three groups of firms. However, the coefficient 
is higher in absolute value when opacity increases, which tends to confirm greater 
positive impact of competition on cost of credit for more opaque companies. We do not 
observe any link between opacity and the relation between competition and cost of credit 
for the H-statistic: the estimated coefficient is not significant for any of the three groups. 
The estimations by firms’ size and by opacity level therefore indicate that the 
positive impact of bank competition on cost of credit is primarily observed for smaller 
and more opaque firms that are most likely to be subject to adverse selection and other 
informational problems. These results provide additional support in favor of the 
information hypothesis. 
 
4.3 Interactions with country-level variables 
Our main estimations indicate that greater bank competition tends to contribute to 
higher cost of credit. As shown by Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2004), this 
influence can be either exacerbated or mitigated by the institutional and economic 
framework. We therefore consider three factors of this framework: financial 
development, economic development, and institutional development. Beck, Demirgüc-
Kunt, and Maksimovic (2004) also take these three factors into account in their analysis 
of the relation between bank concentration and financing obstacles.  
The information hypothesis posits that banks invest in soft information to gain 
better information about opaque borrowers. As a consequence, country-specific factors 
that affect information asymmetries may impact the relationship between bank 
competition and the cost of credit. 
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While, to our best knowledge, we provide the first cross-country analysis on the 
relation between bank competition and the cost of credit, it is worth mentioning that the 
related literature on bank competition and access to credit reports mixed results. Beck, 
Demirgüc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2004) find no impact of financial development on the 
relation between bank concentration and financing obstacles, while greater economic and 
institutional development relaxes financing constraints and bank concentration increases 
financing obstacles. Similarly, Love and Peria (2012) report that low bank competition 
decreases access to finance, but greater financial development mitigates the negative 
impact of low bank competition and facilitates access to credit. 
For bank competition and the cost of credit, we expect financial development and 
economic development to mitigate the existing positive relationship. Financial and 
economic development is often associated with lower information asymmetries 
(Godlewski and Weill, 2011), which could be due to the higher quality of risk analysis 
conducted by bank employees before loan approval. In any case, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the quality of the risk analysis increases with knowledge and skills of bank 
employees, which are positively related to financial and economic development. The 
information hypothesis further implies that opaque borrowers are the ones benefitting 
most from banks’ investment in information collection. Hence, low competition should 
be more beneficial for the cost of credit in a country with higher financial and economic 
development, as such country is expected to face lower information asymmetries. 
We assume that better law enforcement mitigates the positive relation between 
bank competition and the cost of credit. As observed by Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic (2004), a better institutional environment makes enforcement of contracts 
easier and increases the capacity of banks to screen potential borrowers. Better quality of 
institutions diminishes information asymmetries, mitigating the relevance of the 
information hypothesis. 
For empirical testing of variations in the impact of bank competition on the cost of 
credit depending on country-level development, we include interaction terms between 
bank competition and financial, economic and institutional development indicators in our 
main model. If the information hypothesis applies, we expect positive and significant 
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coefficients for the interaction terms when bank competition is measured by Lerner 
index, CR5, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (higher values for these competition 
indicators are associated with lower competition). We also expect lower H-statistic values 
for lower competition, and thus coefficients for interaction terms that are significantly 
negative. The estimation results are reported in Tables 8-10. 
For financial development (Table 8), we obtain the expected positive sign for the 
interaction term between bank competition and Private credit with CR5 and HHI, but the 
coefficient is not significant. The interaction term is negative and significant when bank 
competition is measured by Lerner index, while the interaction term between the H-
statistic and Private credit is significantly positive. These results suggest that greater 
financial development strengthens the beneficial impact of low competition to attenuate 
the cost of credit, and further, that lower competition helps lower the cost of credit, an 
effect amplified by greater financial development. 
How should we interpret such results? Apparently, greater financial development 
can provide greater incentives for banks to invest in relationship lending, notably through 
economies of scale associated with investment in soft information. As such, the 
information hypothesis gains relevance as the level of financial development increases. 
For economic development (Table 9), we find evidence supporting our initial 
conjecture that greater GDP per capita lowers the beneficial impact of low competition 
on the cost of credit. This is evidenced by a positive and significant interaction term 
between bank competition and GDP per capita when competition is measured by Lerner 
index and CR5, and by a negative and significant interaction term between H-statistic and 
GDP per capita. In addition, the interaction term is positive but not significant for HHI. 
We find mixed results when accounting for the institutional development (Table 
10). On the one hand, the results with Lerner index, and H-statistic, support the expected 
view that greater institutional development reduces the beneficial impact of low 
competition on the cost of credit. The interaction term with Rule of law is positive and 
significant with Lerner index, and negative and significant with H-statistic. On the other 
hand, both structural measures of competition tend to support the opposite view, i.e. the 
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interaction term with Rule of law is negative and significant for CR5 and negative but not 
significant for the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. 
Based on the above results, our investigation on how the institutional and economic 
framework influences the relation between competition and the cost of credit yields 
mixed conclusions. Financial development tends to foster the negative relation between 
bank competition and the cost of credit, while economic development seems to bolster it. 
Institutional development has no clear influence on the relationship of bank competition 
and the cost of credit. 
 
4.4 Crisis period 
We extend our analysis by examining if the crisis years that are part of our sample period 
influenced the relation between bank competition and the cost of credit. The crisis can 
exert an impact on the relation by affecting both competition and cost of credit. Namely, 
crisis could have reduced the degree of competition on banking markets in Europe by 
reducing the number of competitors due to mergers and acquisitions. Further, it could 
have increased cost of credit through higher loan losses and lower incentives for banks to 
invest in soft information with the increase of bank costs. 
To investigate the impact of the crisis, we redo our estimations by adding a dummy 
variable equal to one for the crisis years 2008 to 2011 and an interaction term between 
the dummy variable and the competition measure (Table 11). We note that the interaction 
term in all four specifications has an opposite sign from the competition measure. It is 
significant for competition measures with the exception of CR5. This supports the view 
that crisis periods weaken the impact of bank competition on the cost of credit. Here, the 
crisis reduces the positive impact of competition on the cost of credit for all competition 
measures.  
This conclusion is important. It suggests that the impact of bank competition 
changes during periods of crisis, which means policy prescriptions need to adjust to take 
this into account. Indeed, while our results suggest that bank competition should not be 
fostered to lower the cost of credit, this policy would not apply in times of crisis. 
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4.5. Robustness tests 
We check the robustness of our main findings in several different ways. 
First, we use an alternative measure for the cost of credit in our estimations (Table 
12). Using available items for a large number of companies in the Amadeus database, we 
redefine cost of credit as interest paid divided by total bank debt and observe results in 
line with the information hypothesis, i.e. the coefficients are significantly negative for the 
Lerner index and CR5 and positive for the H-statistic. While significant in the main 
estimations, the negative coefficient for HHI is not significant here. Nevertheless, these 
results generally align with our main estimations and thus provide additional support for 
the information hypothesis. 
Second, we perform estimations without accounting for firm fixed effects (Table 
13). This is motivated by the fact that our estimations combine the use of firm fixed 
effects and country-level indicators of bank competition. By not accounting for firm fixed 
effects we are able to exploit the cross-sectional and times series variation of the data. 
The results without firm fixed effects are in line with the main results: the estimated 
coefficients are significant and negative for the Lerner index, CR5 and HHI while the 
coefficient is positive and not significant for the H-statistic. 
Third, we take into account debt composition in the estimations (Table 14). Our 
finding in favor of the information hypothesis can be influenced by the fact that greater 
competition leads banks to provide lines of credit which are more expensive. In such a 
case our result would reflect a debt composition effect. To check this possibility, we 
include the ratio Short-to-long-term debt defined as the ratio of short-term debt to long-
term debt to our main estimations. Due to the fact that many firms included in our sample 
do not have long-term debt, the ratio cannot be calculated for them. Since we do not want 
to lose these observations with useful information, we generate an additional variable No 
long-term debt, which is equal to one when a firm has no long-term debt and to zero 
otherwise.
13
 We find that the results for the competition measures are in line with our 
                                                 
13
 We treat missing values for long-term debt with the method of dummy variable adjustment: when long-
term debt is zero, the ratio Short-to-long-term debt is equal to short-term debt divided by 0.000001. 
Alternatively, we also perform these estimations by considering only firms with positive long-term debt 
and we obtain exactly the same results. 
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main estimations when debt composition is taken into account: we observe a significantly 
negative coefficient for Lerner, CR5, and HHI. The estimated coefficient for H-statistic is 
positive but not significant. The ratio Short-to-long-term debt is not significant in the 
regressions. 
Fourth, we test the simultaneous inclusion of one structural measure and one non-
structural measure of competition in the estimations (Table 15). Our aim is to investigate 
the relation between bank competition and cost of credit, and we do so by testing 
alternatively different measures of bank competition, which can be structural and non-
structural. It can be argued that these two types of indicators do not measure the same 
dimension and may therefore not be considered as substitutes. To this end, we redo 
estimations in which we include together one structural measure (CR5 or HHI) and one 
non-structural measure (the Lerner index or the H-statistic). We observe that the main 
findings on the positive relation between bank competition and cost of credit are valid. 
We still find that the estimated coefficients for Lerner index, CR5, and HHI are 
significant and negative, while the H-statistic is positive. 
Fifth, we investigate whether results differ between old and young firms (Table 16). 
These estimations allow to account for the potential influence of firm entry on the 
relation between bank competition and cost of credit as this relation can be driven by the 
firm entry ratio which influences borrowing demand and loan rates.
14
 Age of firms 
provides information on the recent or old entry of firms to the market. We run our main 
estimations separately for young firms defined as those having an age lower than 9 years 
and old firms. The threshold of 9 years has been chosen since it is the median of the 
sample. We find exactly the same results for young and old firms, with a significant and 
negative coefficient for the Lerner index, CR5, and HHI, and a positive coefficient for the 
H-statistic. This confirms that our main result is not driven by the increase in firm entry. 
Sixth, we include the squared term for the competition measure in the estimations 
to consider possible nonlinearity in the relation between bank competition and cost of 
credit (Table 17). The coefficients for the squared term are significant for all four of our 
competition measures, but do not necessarily support a nonlinear relation. 
                                                 
14
 We have also performed estimations in which we include the ratio of new established firms to total firms, 
computed from Amadeus database. The results are similar. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 19 
In the case of Lerner index, the squared term and the linear term for bank 
competition are both significant and negative. Hence, the inclusion of a squared term 
supports the linear relation observed in the main estimations. 
For the H-statistic and CR5, the inclusion of the squared term is of particular 
interest. The linear term alone is significantly negative and the squared term is 
significantly positive with the H-statistic, while the linear term alone is significantly 
positive and the squared term is significantly negative with the CR5. In other words, we 
observe a nonlinear relation for both indicators with greater competition disfavoring the 
cost of credit up to a certain value, above which greater competition favors the cost of 
credit. 
We can compute this threshold for each indicator. For the H-statistic, the threshold 
is 0.005 while it is 0.621 for CR5. Both values are in the range of the values for the 
sample and below the mean. Thus, the analysis of the nonlinear relation suggests that the 
result that competition strengthens the cost of credit should only be observed after 
competition attains a certain level. 
For the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, we also observe evidence in favor of a 
different nonlinear relation. The linear term alone is significantly negative and the 
squared term is significantly positive. These results support the view that initially the 
HHI value rises (i.e. competition goes down) and the cost of credit falls until a certain 
value for HHI is attained. Above that, the HHI value suggests the cost of credit rises. The 
threshold is 0.0026, which is in the range of our sample. Hence, this negative relationship 
between the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and the cost of credit, in line with our finding 
that greater competition fosters cost of credit, reverses for values of HHI above this 
threshold. 
Our analysis of the nonlinear relationship between bank competition and the cost of 
credit shows results differ depending on the competition indicator. However, they all 
provide evidence that greater competition strengthens the cost of credit for some values.  
Finally, we address the potential endogeneity concern by re-estimating our main 
specification using an instrumental variable strategy. To be valid, an instrumental 
variable needs to be correlated with the included endogenous variable and not correlated 
with the error process. We argue that past levels of financial development of a country 
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and past levels of bank performance are correlated with the current level of bank 
competition, but not correlated with the current interest rates charged by banks. This is 
because the industry structure changes relatively slowly over time when compared to 
interest rates. We, therefore, collect the financial development and bank performance 
measures from the Global Financial Development database with the lag of five years. As 
our four different competition measures capture different dimensions of the market, we 
use different sets of instruments for each competition measure. To ensure that our 
instruments are valid we run a battery of statistical tests.
15
 
The results of the instrumental variables estimations are presented in Tables 18 and 
19. All the competition measures are significant and have the sign consistent with our 
main estimations.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we analyzed the impact of bank competition on the cost of credit using a 
cross-country sample of firms from 20 European countries over the period 2001–2011. 
The market power hypothesis predicts that we should observe a negative relationship 
between bank competition and the cost of credit, because greater competition reduces the 
market power of banks. The information hypothesis, in contrast, expects a positive link 
due to the incentives of banks to invest in soft information. While this question has been 
investigated in single-country studies, it has never been studied in a cross-country 
framework. We fill this gap and consider four competition measures commonly used in 
the literature to take into account the possible differences across these measures. 
Our main finding is that bank competition enhances cost of credit in line with the 
information hypothesis. Our baseline estimations show a positive relation between bank 
competition and the cost of credit with each of our four competition measures. We find 
that this positive influence of bank competition is stronger for smaller companies, which 
also accords with the information hypothesis. 
                                                 
15
 While we report F-statistic for the test of the joint significance of instruments in the first stage regression 
and Hansen J statistic for the overidentifying restrictions test in Tables 18 and 19, other tests recommended 
by Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2007) are also run and available upon request. 
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The positive impact of bank competition is influenced by two additional 
characteristics. It is lower during periods of crisis, and the institutional and economic 
framework influences the relation between competition and the cost of credit. 
Overall, these findings do not support the intuitive view that bank competition 
contributes to a reduction of prices in line with the general economic theory. 
Nevertheless, the banking industry is special due to the importance of information 
asymmetries that provide incentive to invest in technologies that reduce such 
asymmetries. As such, greater competition may shape bank behavior through lower 
incentives that result in higher lending rates. We corroborate the theoretical and empirical 
arguments of Petersen and Rajan (1995), who find lower loan rates in concentrated 
banking markets. 
The take-away lesson for policymakers here is that pro-competitive policies in the 
banking industry can have detrimental effects. Our findings also agree with the view that 
banking competition can have a detrimental influence on financial stability and bank 
efficiency (Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2007; Casu and Girardone, 2010).  
The vices of greater bank competition, however, need to be put into perspective 
with the benefits on access to credit, as stressed by Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic (2004) and Ryan, O’Toole, and McCann (2014). Bank competition can 
contribute to better access to credit by lowering financing obstacles such as collateral 
requirements, even if it does not diminish the cost of credit. In addition, the influence of 
the cost of credit on access to credit is dependent on the elasticity of credit demand. 
The present paper provides the first cross-country investigation of the impact of 
bank competition on the cost of credit. Our analysis may be extended in a number of 
ways to check the general applicability of these findings for other countries and the 
relevance of our interpretations of the findings.  
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Table 1. 
Descriptive statistics 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the main firm-level variables used in the 
econometric analysis. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Competition 
measures are scaled by 100 and the unit of observation is the firm-year. 
 
Variable Obs. 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
Firm size 15 876 307 
 
-0.174 
 
2.029 
 
-4.422 
 
7.784 
Profitability 15 815 714 
 
0.032 
 
0.153 
 
-1.007 
 
0.534 
Tangibility 14 787 186 
 
0.301 
 
0.277 
 
0.000 
 
0.982 
Cost of credit 15 514 105 
 
0.069 
 
0.097 
 
-0.046 
 
0.500 
Lerner 15 340 332 
 
0.002 
 
0.001 
 
-0.016 
 
0.005 
H-statistic 13 445 483 
 
0.006 
 
0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
0.008 
CR5 15 691 243 
 
0.786 
 
0.121 
 
0.479 
 
1.000 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 15 760 781 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.004 
Private credit 15 528 718 
 
115.5 
 
41.00 
 
14.28 
 
237.6 
Rule of law 15 760 781 
 
1.109 
 
0.407 
 
-0.160 
 
1.977 
GDP per capita 15 760 781 
 
29 214 
 
6 691 
 
3 490 
 
51 721 
Inflation 15 760 781 
 
2.244 
 
1.239 
 
-4.480 
 
15.403 
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Table 2. 
Descriptive statistics of the competition measures by countries 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the competition measures for each country. 
 
 
 
Lerner H-statistic CR5 HHI 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Austria 0.158 0.045 0.647 0.144 56.812 13.679 0.051 0.008 
Belgium 0.241 0.030 0.561 0.197 74.506 10.386 0.183 0.029 
Bulgaria 0.270 0.037 0.346 0.142 83.151 5.097 0.077 0.006 
Czech Rep. 0.225 0.098 0.464 0.126 76.068 5.205 0.111 0.008 
Estonia 0.222 0.071 0.717 0.173 99.869 0.392 0.352 0.052 
Finland -0.124 0.602 0.665 0.108 99.126 1.101 0.280 0.053 
France 0.177 0.038 0.558 0.195 37.493 4.882 0.064 0.006 
Germany 0.094 0.038 0.583 0.163 60.776 11.268 0.020 0.005 
Hungary 0.195 0.038 0.547 0.133 85.693 3.503 0.083 0.003 
Ireland 0.230 0.043 0.286 0.193 96.539 5.820 0.069 0.014 
Italy 0.247 0.048 0.589 0.137 58.952 22.736 0.029 0.007 
Latvia 0.223 0.044 0.408 0.256 69.392 3.392 0.111 0.010 
Lithuania 0.137 0.054 0.574 0.147 89.498 2.660 0.192 0.027 
Netherlands 0.175 0.057 0.544 0.202 94.884 5.522 0.190 0.016 
Poland 0.215 0.064 0.533 0.189 64.465 7.514 0.066 0.010 
Portugal 0.180 0.154 0.585 0.120 91.237 7.552 0.111 0.008 
Romania 0.184 0.063 0.470 0.246 84.520 3.852 0.102 0.015 
Slovak Rep. 0.109 0.054 0.456 0.068 97.658 2.296 0.119 0.007 
Slovenia 0.231 0.071 0.593 0.261 92.145 2.500 0.135 0.016 
Spain 0.167 0.103 0.594 0.160 83.299 15.284 0.050 0.004 
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Table 3. 
Main estimations 
 
Panel estimations with firm and time fixed effects. Competition measure indicated at top 
of column. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and 
allow for serial correlation through clustering at the country*industry level. *, **, and 
*** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
 
 Dependent variable = Cost of credit 
  Lerner   H-statistic   CR5   HHI 
Competition -1.144*** 
 
0.341 
 
-0.034*** 
 
-7.029*** 
 
(0.338) 
 
(0.450) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(1.573) 
Size -0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
Tangibility -0.042*** 
 
-0.041*** 
 
-0.042*** 
 
-0.042*** 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
Private credit -1.42e-04** 
 
-5.56e-05 
 
-1.57e-04*** 
 
-1.29e-04** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Rule of law -0.076*** 
 
-0.079*** 
 
-0.063*** 
 
-0.069*** 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
GDP per capita 9.47e-06*** 
 
8.70e-06*** 
 
8.76e-06*** 
 
7.85e-06*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Inflation 0.002*** 
 
0.003*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.001) 
Firm fixed 
effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Time fixed 
effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2
 0.031 
 
0.032 
 
0.031 
 
0.030 
N 13 273 412 
 
11 733 614 
 
13 568 509 
 
13 632 690 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 28 
Table 4. 
Estimations by firm size (1/2) 
 
Panel estimations with firm and time fixed effects. Competition measure indicated at top of column. Standard errors (in parentheses) 
are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering at the country*industry level. *, **, and 
*** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in 
the Appendix. 
 
  Dependent variable = Cost of Credit 
 
Lerner   H-statistic 
  Micro   SME   Large 
 
Micro   SME   Large 
Competition -1.225*** 
 
-1.306*** 
 
-0.191 
 
1.933*** 
 
0.716 
 
0.869 
 
(0.335) 
 
(0.452) 
 
(0.632) 
 
(0.610) 
 
(0.564) 
 
(2.173) 
Size -0.021*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.011*** 
 
-0.022*** 
 
-0.010*** 
 
-0.006** 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
Tangibility -0.042*** 
 
-0.045*** 
 
-0.057*** 
 
-0.041*** 
 
-0.043*** 
 
-0.023** 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.012) 
Private credit 2.47e-05 
 
-1.80e-04** 
 
1.59e-04** 
 
9.27e-05 
 
-7.93e-05 
 
2.07e-04** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Rule of law -0.063*** 
 
-0.079*** 
 
-0.035*** 
 
-0.071*** 
 
-0.086*** 
 
-0.046*** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.018) 
GDP per capita 1.21e-05*** 
 
8.80e-06*** 
 
6.14e-06*** 
 
9.92e-06*** 
 
8.31e-06*** 
 
7.65e-06*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Inflation 0.003*** 
 
0.001** 
 
0.001 
 
0.005*** 
 
0.003*** 
 
0.001 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2
 0.036 
 
0.034 
 
0.016 
 
0.039 
 
0.036 
 
0.020 
N 5 289 345 
 
7 414 912 
 
569 155 
 
4 704 424 
 
6 659 335 
 
369 855 
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Table 5. 
Estimations by firm size (2/2) 
Panel estimations with firm and time fixed effects. Competition measure is indicated at top of column. Standard errors (in parentheses) 
are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering at the country*industry level. *, **, and 
*** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in 
the Appendix. 
 
  Dependent variable = Cost of Credit 
 
CR5 
 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
  Micro 
 
SME 
 
Large 
 
Micro 
 
SME 
 
Large 
Competition -0.055*** 
 
-0.031*** 
 
-0.061*** 
 
-10.642*** 
 
-7.807*** 
 
-2.294 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(1.731) 
 
(1.715) 
 
(6.561) 
Size -0.021*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.011*** 
 
-0.021*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.011*** 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
Tangibility -0.042*** 
 
-0.044*** 
 
-0.057*** 
 
-0.042*** 
 
-0.044*** 
 
-0.057*** 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.013) 
Private credit -3.53e-05 
 
-1.88e-04*** 
 
1.77e-04** 
 
4.02e-05 
 
-1.66e-04** 
 
1.62e-04** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Rule of law -0.053*** 
 
-0.066*** 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.054*** 
 
-0.073*** 
 
-0.032** 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.013) 
GDP per capita 1.17e-05*** 
 
8.00e-06*** 
 
5.87e-06*** 
 
9.69e-06*** 
 
7.33e-06*** 
 
5.60e-06*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Inflation 0.003*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
0.001 
 
0.003*** 
 
0.001** 
 
0.001 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.037 
 
0.034 
 
0.017 
 
0.036 
 
0.034 
 
0.016 
N 5 402 133   7 594 598   571 778   5 430 217   7 629 706   572 767 
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Table 6. 
Estimations by firm opacity (1/2) 
Panel estimations with firm and time fixed effects. Competition measure is indicated at top of column. Standard errors (in parentheses) 
are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering at the country*industry level. *, **, and 
*** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in 
the Appendix. 
 
  Dependent variable = Cost of Credit 
 
Lerner   H-statistic 
  High Medium Low 
 
High Medium Low 
Competition -1.188*** -1.609*** -0.697 
 
-0.305 0.805 -0.215 
 
(0.357) (0.608) (0.959) 
 
(0.603) (0.631) (1.447) 
Size -0.007*** -0.002** -0.001 
 
-0.007*** -0.002* -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility -0.049*** -0.054*** -0.037*** 
 
-0.047*** -0.052*** -0.036*** 
 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Private Credit -1.50e-04** -1.71e-04*** -1.05e-04 
 
-6.24e-05 -9.29e-05 -3.84e-05 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of Law -0.058*** -0.079*** -0.081*** 
 
-0.074*** -0.081*** -0.081*** 
 
(0.014) (0.006) (0.009) 
 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.010) 
GDP per capita 1.13e-05*** 9.25e-06*** 3.65e-06*** 
 
1.09e-05*** 8.50e-06*** 4.58e-06*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002* 
 
0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.034 0.034 0.034 
 
0.036 0.035 0.035 
N 3806792 3869817 3821820   3299379 3404961 3448898 
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Table 7. 
Estimations by firm opacity (2/2) 
Panel estimations with firm and time fixed effects. Competition measure is indicated at top of column. Standard errors (in parentheses) 
are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering at the country*industry level. *, **, and 
*** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in 
the Appendix. 
  Dependent variable = Cost of Credit 
 
CR5 
 
HHI 
  High Medium Low 
 
High Medium Low 
Competition -0.049*** -0.039*** -0.024*** 
 
-6.595*** -7.994*** 6.153 
 
(0.012) (0.008) (0.007) 
 
(1.617) (2.960) (7.441) 
Size -0.007*** -0.002** -0.001 
 
-0.007*** -0.002*** -0.001* 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility -0.048*** -0.054*** -0.037*** 
 
-0.048*** -0.053*** -0.037*** 
 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
Private Credit -1.88e-04*** -1.90e-04*** -1.07e-04 
 
-1.44e-04* -1.57e-04** -9.15e-05 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of Law -0.048*** -0.064*** -0.066*** 
 
-0.052*** -0.071*** -0.078*** 
 
(0.012) (0.006) (0.009) 
 
(0.013) (0.007) (0.010) 
GDP per capita 1.10e-05*** 8.54e-06*** 2.27e-06* 
 
9.06e-06*** 7.53e-06*** 3.21e-06*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002* 
 
0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002* 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.035 0.034 0.034 
 
0.034 0.034 0.033 
N 3846764 3937418 3950329   3876413 3951000 3963451 
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Table 8. 
Impact of financial development 
 
Panel estimations with firm and time fixed effects. Competition measure is indicated at 
top of column. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity 
and allow for serial correlation through clustering at the country*industry level. *, **, 
and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
  Dependent variable = Cost of credit 
  Lerner   H-statistic   CR5   HHI 
Competition -0.030 
 
-3.969*** 
 
-0.043*** 
 
-7.359 
 
(0.332) 
 
(0.500) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(5.808) 
Competition × Private credit -0.014*** 
 
0.058*** 
 
1.10e-04 
 
0.004 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.065) 
Size -0.003*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
Tangibility -0.042*** 
 
-0.041*** 
 
-0.042*** 
 
-0.042*** 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
Private credit -1.22e-04* 
 
-3.97e-04*** 
 
-2.47e-04*** 
 
-1.30e-04** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Rule of law -0.078*** 
 
-0.078*** 
 
-0.063*** 
 
-0.069*** 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
GDP per capita 9.58e-06*** 
 
8.40e-06*** 
 
8.58e-06*** 
 
7.83e-06*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Inflation 0.002*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.001) 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2
 0.031 
 
0.034 
 
0.031 
 
0.030 
N 13 273 412 
 
11 733 614 
 
13 568 509 
 
13 632 690 
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Table 9. 
Impact of economic development 
 
Panel estimations with firm and time fixed effects. Competition measure is indicated at 
the top of the column. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary 
heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering at the 
country*industry level. *, **, and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix. 
 
  Dependent variable = Cost of credit 
  Lerner   H-statistic   CR5   HHI 
Competition -19.121*** 
 
10.895*** 
 
-0.186*** 
 
-11.193 
 
(2.467) 
 
(1.215) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(12.950) 
Competition × GDP per capita 0.001*** 
 
-3.10e-04*** 
 
5.11e-06*** 
 
1.11e-04 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Size -0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
Tangibility -0.042*** 
 
-0.041*** 
 
-0.042*** 
 
-0.042*** 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
Private credit -1.30e-04** 
 
-5.81e-05 
 
-1.58e-04*** 
 
-1.28e-04** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Rule of law -0.091*** 
 
-0.075*** 
 
-0.062*** 
 
-0.069*** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
GDP per capita 8.91e-06*** 
 
1.03e-05*** 
 
4.68e-06*** 
 
7.63e-06*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Inflation 0.002*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2
 0.031 
 
0.033 
 
0.031 
 
0.030 
N 13 273 412   11 733 614   13 568 509   13 632 690 
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Table 10. 
Impact of institutional development 
 
Panel estimations with firm and time fixed effects. Competition measure is indicated at 
top of column. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity 
and allow for serial correlation through clustering at the country*industry level. *, **, 
and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
  Dependent variable = Cost of credit 
  Lerner   H-statistic   CR5   HHI 
Competition -8.382*** 
 
14.068*** 
 
0.026*** 
 
-1.093 
 
(1.811) 
 
(1.531) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(7.092) 
Competition × Rule of law 4.130*** 
 
-8.814*** 
 
-0.090*** 
 
-4.235 
 
(0.916) (0.948) (0.007) (4.304) 
Size -0.003*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
Tangibility -0.042*** 
 
-0.041*** 
 
-0.042*** 
 
-0.042*** 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
Private credit -1.54e-04*** 
 
-4.60e-05 
 
-2.33e-04*** 
 
-1.29e-04** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Rule of law -0.090*** 
 
-0.020** 
 
0.012* 
 
-0.066*** 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
GDP per capita 9.56e-06*** 
 
7.88e-06*** 
 
9.11e-06*** 
 
8.00e-06*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Inflation 0.002*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2
 0.031 
 
0.034 
 
0.031 
 
0.030 
N 13 273 412   11 733 614   13 568 509   13 632 690 
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Table 11. 
Estimations for the crisis period 
 
Panel estimations with firm and time fixed effects. Competition measure is indicated at 
top of column. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity 
and allow for serial correlation through clustering at the country*industry level. *, **, 
and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
  Dependent variable = Cost of credit 
  Lerner   H-statistic   CR5   HHI 
Competition -1.823*** 
 
3.978*** 
 
-0.033*** 
 
-8.493*** 
 
(0.530) 
 
(0.608) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(2.041) 
Competition × Crisis 9.419*** 
 
-11.089*** 
 
0.006 
 
5.340*** 
 
(0.985) 
 
(2.129) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(1.070) 
Size -0.004*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
Tangibility -0.042*** 
 
-0.041*** 
 
-0.042*** 
 
-0.042*** 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
Private credit -9.73e-05* 
 
-2.41e-05 
 
-1.59e-04*** 
 
-1.11e-04* 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Rule of law -0.073*** 
 
-0.080*** 
 
-0.063*** 
 
-0.068*** 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
GDP per capita 8.42e-06*** 
 
6.95e-06*** 
 
8.37e-06*** 
 
6.45e-06*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Inflation 0.003*** 
 
0.003*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2
 0.032 
 
0.033 
 
0.031 
 
0.030 
N 13 273 412 
 
11 733 614 
 
13 568 509 
 
13 632 690 
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Table 12. 
Robustness check: Alternative measure of cost of credit 
 
Panel estimations with firm and time fixed effects. Competition measure is indicated at 
top of column. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity 
and allow for serial correlation through clustering at the country*industry level. *, **, 
and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
  Dependent variable = Cost of credit 
  Lerner   H-statistic   CR5   HHI 
Competition -1.411** 
 
0.277 
 
-0.058*** 
 
-0.335 
 
(0.581) 
 
(0.837) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(3.949) 
Size -0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
Tangibility -0.027*** 
 
-0.026*** 
 
-0.028*** 
 
-0.028*** 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
Private credit 8.26e-05 
 
1.54e-04** 
 
6.71e-05 
 
8.88e-05 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Rule of law -0.096*** 
 
-0.098*** 
 
-0.072*** 
 
-0.090*** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.008) 
GDP per capita 7.17e-06*** 
 
7.42e-06*** 
 
5.56e-06*** 
 
6.49e-06*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Inflation 0.003*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
0.003*** 
 
0.003** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2
 0.049 
 
0.051 
 
0.050 
 
0.048 
N 10 643 150 
 
9 454 541 
 
10 933 579 
 
10 997 664 
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Table 13. 
Robustness check: Estimations without firm effects 
 
OLS estimations. Competition measure is indicated at top of column. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation 
through clustering at the country*industry level. *, **, and *** denote an estimate 
significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
  Dependent variable = Cost of credit 
  Lerner H-statistic CR5 HHI 
Competition -1.229*** 0.305 -0.055*** -5.555*** 
 
(0.288) (0.911) (0.005) (1.931) 
Size -0.001* -0.001 -0.001* -0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Private credit -3.90e-05 2.13e-05 -8.28e-05** -4.01e-05 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of law -0.073*** -0.076*** -0.053*** -0.069*** 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
GDP per capita 5.68e-06*** 5.64e-06*** 4.15e-06*** 4.86e-06*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation -1.41e-04 1.16e-03*** 1.85e-04 -2.51e-04 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.061 0.060 0.062 0.061 
N 13 273 412 11 733 614 13 568 509 13 632 690 
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Table 14. 
Robustness check: Estimations accounting for debt composition 
 
Panel estimations with firm and time fixed effects. Competition measure is indicated at 
top of column. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity 
and allow for serial correlation through clustering at the country*industry level. *, **, 
and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
  Dependent variable = Cost of credit 
  Lerner H-statistic CR5 HHI 
Competition -0.486** 0.333 -0.019*** -6.772*** 
 
(0.228) (0.430) (0.004) (1.591) 
Size -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.036*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Private credit -3.00e-04*** -2.32e-04*** -3.03e-04*** -2.87e-04*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of law -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.043*** -0.045*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
GDP per capita 5.27e-06*** 4.68e-06*** 4.97e-06*** 4.21e-06*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation 0.001** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Short-to-long-term debt 5.21e-10 1.15e-09 5.24e-10 5.08e-10 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No long-term debt 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.060 0.062 0.059 0.059 
N 13 273 412 11 733 614 13 568 509 13 632 690 
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Table 15. 
Robustness check: Estimations including structural 
and non-structural measures of competition 
 
Panel estimations with firm and time fixed effects. The main competition measure is 
indicated at top of column. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary 
heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering at the 
country*industry level. *, **, and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix. 
 
  Dependent variable = Cost of credit 
  Lerner Lerner H-statistic H-statistic 
Competition -2.671*** -1.097*** 0.411 1.250*** 
(non-structural) (0.660) (0.342) (0.433) (0.449) 
CR5 -0.035*** 
 
-0.037*** 
 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 HHI 
 
-4.807** 
 
-24.335*** 
  
(2.015) 
 
(3.568) 
Size -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Private credit -1.71e-04*** -1.40e-04** -9.44e-05* -5.04e-05 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of law -0.070*** -0.074*** -0.068*** -0.074*** 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
GDP per capita 9.70e-06*** 9.05e-06*** 8.18e-06*** 6.66e-06*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.031 0.031 0.033 0.033 
N 13 238 318 13 273 412 11 715 718 11 733 614 
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Table 16. 
Robustness check: Estimations by firms’ age 
 
Panel estimations with firm and time fixed effects. Competition measure is indicated at top of column. Standard errors (in parentheses) 
are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering at the country*industry level. *, **, and 
*** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in 
the Appendix. 
  Dependent variable = Cost of credit 
  Firm Age < Median (=9) 
 
Firm Age ≥ Median (=9) 
  Lerner H-statistic CR5 HHI 
 
Lerner H-statistic CR5 HHI 
Competition -1.086*** -0.614 -0.025*** -5.741** 
 
-1.147*** -0.114 -0.039*** -8.066*** 
 
(0.390) (0.514) (0.005) (2.627) 
 
(0.334) (0.498) (0.007) (1.288) 
Size -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
-0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.041*** 
 
-0.043*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Private credit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
-0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of law -0.059*** -0.063*** -0.051*** -0.053*** 
 
-0.080*** -0.084*** -0.064*** -0.073*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
GDP per capita 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.026 0.028 0.026 0.026 
 
0.035 0.036 0.035 0.034 
N 5878584 5226190 5991163 6015890   6980205 6133419 7150289 7187567 
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Table 17. 
Robustness check: Nonlinear relation 
 
Panel estimations with firm and time fixed effects. Competition measure is indicated at 
top of column. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity 
and allow for serial correlation through clustering at the country*industry level. *, **, 
and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
  Dependent variable = Cost of credit 
  Lerner   H-statistic   CR5   HHI 
Competition -2.411*** 
 
-31.417*** 
 
0.190*** 
 
-28.534*** 
 
(0.612) 
 
(4.153) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(10.278) 
Competition squared -129.632*** 
 
2997.767*** 
 
-0.153*** 
 
5369.688** 
 
(40.170) 
 
(393.882) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(2276.056) 
Size -0.003*** 
 
-0.005*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
Tangibility -0.042*** 
 
-0.041*** 
 
-0.042*** 
 
-0.042*** 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
Private credit -1.47e-04** 
 
-3.36e-05 
 
-1.96e-04*** 
 
-1.28e-04** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Rule of law -0.079*** 
 
-0.088*** 
 
-0.066*** 
 
-0.064*** 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
GDP per capita 9.51e-06*** 
 
7.61e-06*** 
 
1.04e-05*** 
 
6.79e-06*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Inflation 0.002*** 
 
0.003*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
0.001*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2
 0.031 
 
0.034 
 
0.031 
 
0.030 
N 13 273 412   11 733 614   13 568 509   13 632 690 
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Table 18. 
Robustness check: IV estimation (1/2) 
 
IV estimations with firm and time fixed effects. Competition measure is indicated at top 
of column. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and 
allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. *, **, and *** denote an estimate 
significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
  Lerner H-statistic 
 
 Cost of 
Credit 
 Cost of 
Credit 
Competition 
 
-0.957*** 
 
17.206*** 
 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.189) 
Size 7.34e-05*** -0.003*** 1.03e-04*** 2.31e-04*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangibility 9.60e-06*** -0.042*** 7.31e-06*** -0.039*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private credit -4.93e-06*** -1.26e-04*** -4.23e-06*** -7.4e-05*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of law -0.002*** -0.075*** 0.003*** -0.114*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
GDP per capita 8.63e-08*** 9.31e-06*** -3.36e-07*** 1.43e-05*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation -2.17e-04*** 0.002*** -5.1e-05*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Outstanding international 
public debt securities to GDPt-5 
-1.50e-04*** 
 
  
 
(0.000) 
 
  Turnover ratio for stock 
markett-5 
2.48e-06*** 
 
  
 
(0.000) 
 
  Bank capital to total assetst-5   1.79e-04*** 
 
 
  
(0.000) 
 Bank net interest margint-5   3.49e-04*** 
 
 
  
(0.000) 
 Time FEs Yes Yes 
Firm FEs Yes Yes 
F-statistic 7.3e+06*** 
 
1.4e+05*** 
 Hansen J statistic 
 
0.199 
 
0.079 
R
2
 0.812 0.031 0.9647 0.024 
N 11,187,326 11,187,326 9,550,169 9,550,169 
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Table 19. 
Robustness check: IV estimation (2/2) 
 
IV estimations with firm and time fixed effects. Competition measure is indicated at top 
of column. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and 
allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. *, **, and *** denote an estimate 
significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
 
  CR5 HHI 
  Cost of Credit  Cost of Credit 
Competition 
 
-0.193*** 
 
-17.589*** 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.734) 
Size 0.006*** -0.002*** 2.39e-06*** -0.003*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangibility -0.001*** -0.042*** 6.73e-06*** -0.041*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Private credit 0.001*** -2.67e-04 -2.74e-06 -2.28e-04*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of law 0.213*** -0.023*** 3.66e-04*** -0.076*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
GDP per capita 0.020*** 9.59e-06*** -3.82e-08*** 8.41e-06*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation 
 
0.003*** -2.14e-05*** -4.37e-04*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank return on assets (after 
tax)t-5 0.021***  
  
 
(0.000) 
 
  Stock market capitalization 
to GDPt-5 0.001***  
  
 
(0.000) 
 
  Outstanding international 
public debt securities to 
GDPt-5 
 
 
-5.33e-06*** 
 
  
 
(0.000) 
 Private credit depositst-5 
 
 6.23e-06*** 
 
 
    (0.000)   
Time FEs Yes Yes 
Firm FEs Yes Yes 
F-statistic 5.2e+05*** 
 
1.8e+05*** 
 Hansen J statistic 
 
1.29 
 
0.676 
R
2
 0.480 0.023 0.375 0.031 
N 11,154,953 11,154,953 10,117,193 10,117,193 
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Appendix 
Variable Definition 
Firm size = log(total assets). Source: Amadeus. 
Tangibility = tangible fixed assets /total assets. Source: Amadeus. 
Cost of credit = (financial expenses /total debt) – country nominal short-term 
interest rate. Source: Amadeus and SDW. 
Lerner Measure of market power in the banking market that compares 
output pricing and marginal costs (i.e. markup). An increase in 
the Lerner index indicates a deterioration of the competitive 
conduct of financial intermediaries. Source: Global Financial 
Development Database, World Bank. 
CR5  Assets of five largest banks as a share of total commercial 
banking assets. Source: Global Financial Development Database, 
World Bank. 
H-statistic Degree of competition in the banking market as measured by the 
elasticity of bank revenues relative to input prices. The H-statistic 
suggests market structure on a continuum with 0 indicating 
monopoly and 1 perfect competition. Source: Weill (2013) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index 
Defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of all 
firms within the industry with market share expressed as a 
fraction. Source: ECB SDW Database. 
Rule of law This variable captures the extent to which agents have confidence 
in the rule of law and how well they expects members of society 
to abide by the rules. In particular, looks at the perceptions about 
the quality of enforcement of contract law and property rights, as 
well as the behavior of the police and the courts, and the 
frequency of crime and violence. Source: Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, World Bank. 
Private credit Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP. Source: Global 
Financial Development Database, World Bank. 
Outstanding 
international public debt 
securities to GDP 
Amount of public international debt securities (amount 
outstanding), as a share of GDP. It covers long-term bonds and 
notes and money market instruments placed on international 
markets. Source: Global Financial Development Database, World 
Bank. 
Turnover ratio for stock 
market 
Total value of shares traded during the period divided by the 
average market capitalization for the period. Source: Global 
Financial Development Database, World Bank. 
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Bank capital to total 
assets 
Ratio of bank capital and reserves to total assets. Capital and 
reserves include funds contributed by owners, retained earnings, 
general and special reserves, provisions, and valuation 
adjustments. Capital includes tier 1 capital (paid-up shares and 
common stock), which is a common feature in all countries' 
banking systems, and total regulatory capital, which includes 
several specified types of subordinated debt instruments that need 
not be repaid if the funds are required to maintain minimum 
capital levels (these comprise tier 2 and tier 3 capital). Total 
assets include all nonfinancial and financial assets. Source: 
Global Financial Development Database, World Bank. 
Bank net interest margin Accounting value of bank's net interest revenue as a share of its 
average interest-bearing (total earning) assets. Source: Global 
Financial Development Database, World Bank. 
Bank return on assets Commercial banks’ after-tax net income to yearly averaged total 
assets. Source: Global Financial Development Database, World 
Bank. 
Stock market 
capitalization to GDP 
Total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage 
of GDP. Source: Global Financial Development Database, World 
Bank. 
Private credit deposits The financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic 
money banks as a share of GDP. Domestic money banks 
comprise commercial banks and other financial institutions that 
accept transferable deposits, such as demand deposits. Source: 
Global Financial Development Database, World Bank. 
 
 
